地理学报 ›› 2020, Vol. 75 ›› Issue (8): 1667-1679.doi: 10.11821/dlxb202008008

• 区域与乡村发展 • 上一篇    下一篇

尺度政治视角下的新安江流域生态补偿政府主体博弈

任以胜1(), 陆林2(), 虞虎3, 朱道才4   

  1. 1.安徽师范大学经济管理学院,芜湖 241002
    2.安徽师范大学地理与旅游学院,芜湖 241002
    3.中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所,北京 100101
    4.安徽财经大学城市与县域研究中心,蚌埠 233030
  • 收稿日期:2018-10-11 修回日期:2020-07-08 出版日期:2020-08-25 发布日期:2020-10-25
  • 通讯作者: 陆林
  • 作者简介:任以胜(1988-), 男, 安徽肥西人, 博士, 讲师, 主要从事城市地理与城市经济研究。E-mail:renyisheng88@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(41930644)

Game of government subjects of eco-compensation in the Xin'an River basin based on the politics of scale

REN Yisheng1(), LU Lin2(), YU Hu3, ZHU Daocai4   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Anhui Normal University, Wuhu 241002, Anhui, China
    2. School of Geography and Tourism, Anhui Normal University, Wuhu 241002, Anhui, China
    3. Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, CAS, Beijing 100101, China
    4. Research Center for Urban and County, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030, Anhui, China
  • Received:2018-10-11 Revised:2020-07-08 Online:2020-08-25 Published:2020-10-25
  • Contact: LU Lin
  • Supported by:
    National Natural Science Foundation of China(41930644)

摘要:

流域生态补偿是中国跨区域生态治理和自然区域保护的一项重要经济、社会、环境政策,涉及区域利益主体权益差异与协调、区域生态协同发展和合作模式构建等方面,是一个典型的地理学研究命题。本文将制度粘性引入到尺度政治理论中,剖析新安江流域生态补偿政府主体的博弈行为,探究不同政府主体的博弈特征和博弈机制。结果表明:中央政府、省级政府、市级政府等不同层级政府主体经历了竞争博弈、合作博弈和竞合博弈3个阶段,构建政府利益共同体能够推进流域生态补偿建设,中央政府的“适度介入”是开展跨省流域生态补偿的关键;流域生态补偿制度从“垂直”模式向“垂直—水平”模式的变迁过程中存在明显的制度粘性,政府主体利用政策革新和社会参与等制度约束稀释制度粘性,重塑流域生态补偿制度;尺度转换是推动新安江流域生态补偿的核心机制,政府主体通过重新分配权力和资本、嵌入非正式约束塑造流域生态补偿话语体系,推动新安江流域生态补偿由“强国家—弱社会”向“强国家—强社会”结构模式的转变。研究结果能够为构建跨区域流域生态补偿机制提供理论支撑,为合理评价和指导流域生态补偿实践、促进流域经济社会协调可持续发展提供科学依据。

关键词: 生态补偿, 尺度转换, 制度粘性, 博弈策略, 新安江流域

Abstract:

Watershed eco-compensation is a significant economic, social and environmental policy for cross-regional ecological governance and natural region protection in China. As a typical geography research proposition, it involves the difference and coordination of the regional stakeholders' rights, regional ecological coordinated development and cooperation model construction. This paper introduced the institutional stickiness into the politics of scale theory, analyzed the game behavior of the government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River basin, and explored the game characteristics and game mechanisms of governments at all levels. The results imply that the game among the central government, provincial government, municipal government and other government departments have gone through three stages: competition, cooperation and competition-cooperation. Building a community of government interests can promote the construction of watershed eco-compensation, and the "moderate intervention" of the central government is the key to carry out trans-provincial watershed eco-compensation. There is obvious institutional stickiness in the transition process of watershed eco-compensation system from "vertical" model to "vertical-horizontal" model. Government subjects use institutional constraints such as policy innovation and social participation to dilute the institutional stickiness and reshape the watershed eco-compensation system. Scale transformation is the core mechanism to promote eco-compensation in the Xin'an River basin. Government subjects shape the discourse system of watershed eco-compensation by redistributing power and capital and embedding informal constraints, so as to promote the transition of eco-compensation in the study area from "strong state-weak society" to "strong state-strong society" structural model. The research results can provide the theoretical support for the construction of trans-regional watershed eco-compensation mechanism, and form the scientific basis for the evaluation and guidance of watershed eco-compensation practice in the coordinated and sustainable development of watershed economy and society.

Key words: eco-compensation, scale transformation, institutional stickiness, game strategy, Xin'an River basin