地理学报 ›› 2019, Vol. 74 ›› Issue (2): 312-322.doi: 10.11821/dlxb201902008

• 地缘经济与区域发展 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于成本—收益的长三角地方政府的区域合作行为机制案例分析

陈雯1,2(),王珏3,孙伟1   

  1. 1. 中国科学院南京地理与湖泊研究所 中国科学院流域地理学重点实验室,南京 210008
    2. 中国科学院大学资源与环境学院,北京 100049
    3. 香港中文大学地理与资源管理学系,香港 999077
  • 收稿日期:2018-01-08 出版日期:2019-02-25 发布日期:2019-01-29
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金重点项目(41130750);美丽中国生态文明建设科技工程专项(XDA230201)

Cost-efficiency mechanism and game-action of inter-local governmental cooperation in the Yangtze River Delta Region

CHEN Wen1,2(),WANG Jue3,SUN Wei1   

  1. 1. Nanjing Institute of Geography and Limnology, CAS, Key Laboratory Watershed Geographic Sciences, CAS, Nanjing 210008, China
    2. Department of Resource and Environment, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
    3. Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, NT, Hong Kong 999077, China
  • Received:2018-01-08 Online:2019-02-25 Published:2019-01-29
  • Supported by:
    Key Project of National Natural Science Foundation of China, No.41130750;Strategic Priority Research Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, No.XDA230201

摘要:

在全球化和区域一体化背景下,区域合作已成为各地区应对全球化、增强竞争力的重要手段,政府又在促进区域合作中扮演着至关重要的角色。本文以博弈论和政府行为理论为基础,结合利益相关者和成本收益分析法,提出共享型、损益型、比较利益型三种地方政府合作模式及其成本—收益分析框架,并据此考察中国区域合作典范长三角地区的旅游、交通、环境三个关键领域的合作博弈案例,深入阐释基于成本—收益的政府不同合作模式的合作动力、行为及其策略等,使之丰富区域一体化和城市政府合作等研究,也为进一步推动长三角一体化提供科学参考。

关键词: 城市政府, 合作机制, 成本—收益;, 博弈机理, 长江三角洲

Abstract:

Under the background of globalization and regional integration, regional cooperation is viewed as a crucial approach to dealing with various challenges in the context of globalization, and likewise as a prerequisite for maintaining the cities' comparative advantages as well as competitiveness. Although different actors involving private enterprises, research agencies and other organizations have jointly participated in the regional organization, and local governments have played dominant roles in the cross-border cooperation by controlling the majority of social resources and assuming the responsibility of managing the economic activities within their jurisdictional areas. By applying the cost-benefit analysis based on the game theory and governmental behavior theory, this paper attempts to put forward three models of intergovernmental cooperation and builds a new theoretical framework to explain how the mutual gains and costs of the cooperative efforts drive the governmental behavior. Then, by focusing on the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) region, three typical cases of cooperation events, the YRD accessible travel circle (Changsanjiao wuzhang'ai lyuyouquan), Shanghai-Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Anhui expressway (shensuzhewan gaosu gonglu) and the management of Jiangsu-Zhejiang transboundary water pollution are selected to examine the three models of intergovernmental cooperation, namely, win-win model, comparative interest model, and win-lose model. This paper explains different types of cost-benefit, cooperation powers, and behavioral strategies under different cooperation modes. Through tracing the process of cooperation formation and investigating intergovernmental interaction, this paper argues that the cooperative gains and costs significantly influence the governmental behavior, and further shape different models of intergovernmental cooperation. Based on the empirical analysis, this paper suggests that cooperative mechanism including mutual trust mechanism, dialogue and consultation mechanisms, benefit-sharing mechanisms, as well as supervision mechanism should be formed in the further promotion of regional cooperation in the Yangtze River Delta.

Key words: city government, cooperation model, cost-benefit, game mechanism, Yangtze River Delta